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Decree 177 of 2026: What companies in the energy, environmental and territorial development sectors need to know

  • Foto del escritor: Guerrero Ruiz | Legal
    Guerrero Ruiz | Legal
  • hace 1 día
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Guerrero Ruiz | Legal


On February 24, the national government issued Decree 177 of 2026, a regulation with the force of law—enacted under the State of Economic, Social, and Ecological Emergency declared by Decree 150 of February 11—that introduces significant changes to the environmental regulations for several productive sectors. The decree responds to the floods caused by the atypical behavior of a cold front between February 1 and 6, 2026, which affected more than 252,000 people in the departments of Córdoba, Antioquia, La Guajira, Sucre, Bolívar, Cesar, Magdalena, and Chocó.


That said, the humanitarian and climate emergency is real. And so is the legal problem.


An emergency regulation with effects that go far beyond the emergency.


The measures contained in this decree are not limited to responding to the immediate disaster. Several of them reconfigure, temporarily but with potentially long-lasting consequences, the conditions under which hydroelectric projects, water concessions, projects in forest reserves, and land-use planning instruments operate in the affected departments. Some of these measures warrant careful review—and, in several cases, a structured legal response.


The blow to the electricity sector: the 2% surcharge


Article 11 of the decree introduces an additional charge of two percent (2%) on gross energy sales from self-generation, applicable for six months to hydroelectric generating companies and thermal power plants whose infrastructure operates in river basins of the departments declared in emergency.


Here are two issues that immediately stand out:


The first issue is the inclusion of thermal power plants. The decree bases its entire justification on the alteration of water dynamics and the impacts of the emergency on basins and reservoirs. However, in Article 11, it extends the surcharge to thermal power plants. What causal link exists between the operation of a thermal power plant and the flooding of the Sinú River? The decree does not explain this convincingly, and this weakness in its rationale opens a legitimate avenue for questioning.


The second issue is the legal nature of the measure. The decree frames it within the electricity sector transfers regulated by Article 45 of Law 99 of 1993—a earmarked parafiscal contribution—and cites Constitutional Court jurisprudence to argue that there are no acquired rights regarding this type of charge. This is generally true. However, modifying the transfer regime through an ordinary legislative process is one thing, and doing so through an emergency decree, whose constitutional framework requires that each measure have a direct and specific connection to the crisis, is quite another. For companies in the sector, it is worth analyzing whether the imposed charge truly meets this standard of connection.


Environmental obligations take precedence over contracts


Article 2 empowers the ANLA to modify the environmental management and control instruments for hydroelectric projects for which the IDEAM has issued hydrometeorological alerts. These modifications may include defining reserve volumes in reservoirs, calculated based on return periods of five hundred years or more as a minimum reference.


In operational terms, this represents a substantial change in the conditions under which many projects were designed and licensed. And the decree doesn't stop there: the paragraph of Article 2 expressly stipulates that the environmental measures derived from this regulation will prevail over any other operational, commercial, or contractual commitment associated with the project.


In practical terms, this means that if complying with the new environmental obligation means being unable to honor a long-term power purchase agreement, environmental commitments win. No further ado.


For generators with firm power purchase agreements—whose Reliability Charge obligation is tied to very specific availability commitments—this provision creates a real tension that has no easy solution. If the ANLA modifies the reservoir's operating conditions and this affects the committed generation capacity, who bears the cost? Does this constitute regulatory non-compliance? Is there any regulatory adjustment that the CREG can make in such an event? These questions are not answered in the decree, and this silence is, in itself, a legal problem.


The emergency water round: an instrument with immediate binding power


Article 4 authorizes the Regional Autonomous Corporations to define and adopt, on a temporary and urgent basis, an estimated water zone in the affected territories. This zone will be based on the geomorphological information available in the POMCA (Watershed Management Plans)—even if those plans have not been formally adopted—and must be communicated to the territorial entities within two months for their incorporation as an environmental determinant in the territorial planning instruments.


The practical problem is that a water buffer zone, even if called "temporary" or "estimated," acts as a real restriction on land use from the moment it is adopted. If a plot of land falls within that estimated buffer zone, land development decisions, building permits, and environmental authorizations that depend on that regulation are immediately affected.


For landowners in riverine areas, for promoters of infrastructure projects in those departments, and for municipalities that are in the middle of reviewing their Land Use Plans, this article may generate de facto restrictions that are applied before there is technical and legal certainty about their definitive limits.


The decree states that this measure does not replace the ordinary delimitation procedure. But in practice, while that ordinary procedure unfolds—which can take more than a year—the estimated round will operate as a binding environmental determinant. The difference between “transitional” and “definitive” can become quite blurred.


The risk management component of the POMCA: from instrument under construction to environmental determinant in 15 days


Article 3 mandates that the Regional Autonomous Corporations (CARs) adopt, within fifteen days, through an administrative act, the technical information on the risk management component of the POMCAs (Watershed Management Plans) that are currently being formulated. From that moment on, this information will have the status of an environmental determining factor for territorial entities.


The rationale behind the measure is understandable: if technical information on high-risk areas already exists, why wait for the POMCA (Water Management Plan) to be formally adopted for that information to become legally binding? The decree answers: there's no need to wait. The information already available becomes binding now.


What the decree fails to address is what happens to ongoing processes that were already progressing under the previous environmental regulations. If a project had environmental or territorial viability under the current POMCA (Water Management Plan), and the new, urgently adopted risk component classifies it as a high-risk zone, what happens to the rights already established? Is there a transition period? Are appeals possible against the administrative act that adopts this determination?

The decree is silent on this matter. And that silence could have very costly consequences for those who already have committed investments in the affected territories.


Works in forest reserves: the exception that needs control


Article 10 exempts emergency response activities—risk management, mitigation, and urgent works—not already covered by prior ministerial resolutions from the standard procedure for removing areas from the National Forest Reserve. The requirement is to inform the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development within six months of the decree's entry into force about the affected areas and the activities carried out.


Note the logic: intervention comes first, and reporting follows (as outlined in Resolution 0083 of 2026, which we recently analyzed in this column). This might make sense in a genuine emergency. However, it also opens the door to projects being carried out in forest reserves whose justification in terms of the emergency is questionable, and to ministerial oversight only arriving after the damage has already been done.


For companies with projects near or within these reserves, and which have historically had to navigate extraction processes that can take years, it is worthwhile to understand precisely which activities are permitted under this article and which are not. The line between “risk management” and “exploitation of the exception” can be fine, and the implications of crossing it are serious.


The abbreviated procedure: not everything is restriction


It is worth noting that Article 9 introduces a measure that, for some stakeholders, is positive: the terms of environmental procedures for concessions, permits, and authorizations related to water and basic sanitation are reduced to one-third. This applies during the state of emergency and for up to six months after its conclusion.


For public water and sanitation service providers needing to act quickly in the affected areas, this reduction in timeframes can be a valuable tool. The caveat is that the decree clearly states that technical standards and the stages of public notice and challenge are not being reduced: what is being expedited is the administrative process, not the substantive requirements.


What to do now?


This decree has been in effect since February 24, 2026. Some of the deadlines for implementing its measures are already running —the fifteen days for the CARs to adopt the risk components of the POMCA, for example, expire in the first days of March.


For companies in the energy sector, infrastructure operators in riverine areas, landowners in departments declared in a state of emergency, and project promoters who depend on environmental permits in those regions, the first step is to make a clear diagnosis of how each of these measures specifically affects them.


Some of the most pressing questions are: Do your energy contracts contain clauses that address regulatory changes of this kind? Do you have licensed projects that could be affected by the new transitional water round or by the urgent adoption of the POMCA risk component? Do you operate in affected basins and are you exposed to the 2% surcharge? Do you have assets or projects within or adjacent to national forest reserves in the aforementioned departments?


At Guerrero Ruiz | Legal, we are closely monitoring the implementation of this decree and the administrative acts issued in its execution. If your company, trade association, or sector has interests in the affected territories, now is the time to review your exposure and define a strategy.


Download Decree 177 of 2026 here:


This review is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific advice regarding your situation, please contact us: info@guerreroruiz.com




 
 
 

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